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In this article, we analyze a decentralized supply chain consisting of a supplier and two independent retailers.In each order cycle, retailers place their orders at the supplier to minimize inventory-related expected costs at
the end of their respective response times. There are two types of lead times involved. At the end of the supplier
lead time, retailers are given an opportunity to readjust their initial orders (without changing the total order
size), so that both retailers can improve their expected costs at the end of respective retailer lead times (the time
it takes for items to be shipped from the supplier to the retailers). Because of the possibility of cooperation at
the end of supplier lead time, each retailer will consider the other’s order-up-to level in making the ordering
decision. Under mild conditions, we prove the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium for the retailer order-
up-to levels, and show that they can be obtained by solving a set of newsboy-like equations. We also present
computational analysis that provides valuable managerial insight for design and operation of decentralized
systems under the possibility of partial cooperation.
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1. Introduction and Motivation
In this article, we investigate a decentralized supply
chain of two independent retailers (or manufactur-
ers) and a supplier. In the system that we analyze,
retailers order a common product (or raw material)
from the supplier to fulfill their own random cus-
tomer demand. We consider a periodic review system
where each retailer places an order at regular inter-
vals to raise its inventory position to a predetermined
level. The supplier has ample capacity to satisfy the
orders placed by the retailers, but there is a fixed lead
time (supplier lead time) associated with order prepa-
ration (because of supplier’s manufacturing or order-
ing lead time, packaging, and loading times at the
supplier’s plant, and possibly transportation time to
the warehouse). At the end of the supplier lead time,
orders are shipped to retailers. We also assume that
there is a fixed shipment lead time associated with
each retailer (retailer lead time). When the order is
received by a retailer, it is used to satisfy the customer
demand and accordingly inventory-related holding
and backorder costs are incurred.
When orders are ready to be shipped (at the
end of the supplier lead time) there is an ideal
inventory position for retailers that they would like
to attain, which minimizes their inventory-related
expected costs at the end of their respective response
time (retailer lead time plus one period). However,
as the demand observed during the supplier lead
time is random, their realized inventory positions
229
Güllü, van Houtum, Sargut, and Erkip: Analysis of a Decentralized Supply Chain Under Partial Cooperation
230 Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 7(3), pp. 229–247, © 2005 INFORMS
will be either below or above that particular level
(if demands are assumed to be continuous, being
at the ideal level has zero probability). Therefore, a
possible transfer of retailer orders at the supplier’s
plant (or at the cross-docking warehouse), before they
are shipped to retailers, may improve the inventory-
related costs of the retailers. However, as the sup-
ply chain is decentralized, retailers will allow such a
transaction only if the transfer yields an improvement
for both of them. In Figure 1, we provide an illustra-
tion of the system. Our setting fits best for systems
where the supplier-retailer chain cannot enjoy the full
benefits of centralized decision making, but a room
for cooperation still exists, if it improves the perfor-
mance of both retailers. We detail the extend of coop-
eration between retailers by referring to the following
examples:
(1) Consider two manufacturing plants in Europe,
operating under the same corporation but serving
different markets. Managers of each plant are eval-
uated with respect to their own performance. They
order computer chips from an Asian supplier and
they agree on readjusting their original orders at the
end of the supplier lead time provided that it does
not deteriorate their own performance. Because the
readjustment will not affect the total quantity ordered
from the supplier, no costs are associated with such
a transaction. A typical example would be to have
two manufacturers, one in Rotterdam and the other
in Switzerland that are collaborating. The shipment
time from Asia is approximately four to five weeks.
Depending on the item in question, the order interval
may very well be once in every month or less fre-
quent. Hence it may be the case that the lead time
from the supplier is less than the reorder interval of
the manufacturers.











(2) Consider two retail stores for an apparel chain,
supplied through a common regional cross-docking
warehouse. Orders can be readjusted at the ware-
house just before the trucks are loaded. Again, both
stores would agree to such a transaction as long as it
improves their performances.
As depicted in Figure 1, an order cycle is divided into
two subcycles. At the beginning of the order cycle,
each retailer places an order at the supplier. At the
end of the first subcycle (at the end of the supplier
lead time), retailers reassess their stock position, and
decide whether a transfer of stock is to occur. Then,
they inform the supplier (or the cross-docking ware-
house) of their decision. Because no physical trans-
shipment takes place (the transaction occurs either
at the suppliers plant or at the cross-docking ware-
house), we assume that the cost of transfer is negli-
gible. Each retailer starts the second subcycle with its
new inventory position, and at the end of the order
cycle, associated costs are incurred.
The main objective of this article is to charac-
terize the optimal order-up-to levels that the retail-
ers base their ordering amounts from the supplier.
Because there is a possibility of stock transfer at
the supplier, the order-up-to level of one retailer
would have an affect on the choice of order-up-to
level of the other retailer (consider the extreme case,
where one retailer places an order of size infinity,
and therefore it is always willing to transfer any
required amount to the other retailer). Moreover, if
retailers share relevant information (such as costs,
demand distributions, inventory levels), then each
retailer can compute its order-up-to level with the
knowledge of the other retailer’s possible inventory
decision. This leads to a Nash equilibrium setting.
Note that this model is decentralized as each retailer
tries to minimize its own inventory-related costs. We
would like to obtain the equilibrium solution of the
system described above, and measure its potential
benefits.
To be able to assess the benefits of the model that
we pose, we specify the following three models (one
of them being the one that we propose), each with a
different degree of interaction between retailers:
(1) Decentralized model with stock transfer. This is the
proposed model. Each retailer determines its order-
up-to level independently, but with the knowledge
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of other retailer’s relevant information (such as costs,
demand distributions, inventory levels). Moreover,
retailers allow stock transfer at the supplier’s site as
long as a transfer improves expected costs of both
retailers.
(2) Decentralized model without stock transfer. Retail-
ers determine their order-up-to levels independently,
and they do not exercise the stock transfer. In this
model, there is no information sharing between
retailers.
(3) Centralized model. Instead of determining indi-
vidual order-up-to levels for the retailers, a sys-
temwide order-up-to level that minimizes expected
total costs is obtained. Then, at the end of the supplier
lead time, each retailer is allocated a stock amount
that will minimize the systemwide expected cost.
With the help of the models posed, we also would like
to answer several questions pertaining to the behavior
of the system. The answers to the following questions
are expected to yield important managerial insight on
operation of such systems:
(1) What is the degree of improvement (in terms of
costs and safety stocks) gained by stock transfer and
information availability between retailers?
(2) How far is the performance of the proposed
model from the centralized model?
(3) Which form of collaboration brings the most
benefits (transfer of stock or using the knowledge of
other retailer’s order-up-to level in determining the
order quantity)?
In this article, we make four major contributions:
(1) we present and analyze a model of a decentral-
ized supply chain where a retailer determines its
order-up-to level by taking into account the possibil-
ity of transfer of stock and with the knowledge of
other retailer’s relevant information, (2) under this
setting, we prove the existence of a unique Nash equi-
librium of retailer order-up-to levels, (3) we introduce
a key random variable, the net change in the retailer
stock position after readjustment of retailer orders,
and provide its distribution function, which facili-
tates an explicit characterization of optimal order-
up-to level through a newsboy-like equation, and
(4) we present our computational analysis that pro-
vides valuable managerial insight for design and
operation of decentralized systems under the possi-
bility of stock transfer.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In §2,
we review the related literature. In §3, we present the
mathematical model and derive the expected cycle
costs for the retailers. Our analysis relies on the char-
acterization of a random variable denoting the net
change in a retailer’s stock position after transfer of
stock occurs. In §4, we derive the distribution func-
tion of that random variable, and discuss its various
properties. We prove the existence of a unique Nash
equilibrium in §5. Computational findings and dis-
cussion of results are presented in §6. We present our
concluding remarks and discuss extensions in §7.
2. Related Literature
A stream of research related to ours is the two-echelon
inventory models with transshipment. Such systems
are widely studied in the literature when the deci-
sion making is centralized. Krishnan and Rao (1965)
and Gross (1963) are early examples of models with
transshipment. Das (1975) extends the single-period
model of Gross (1963) to allow transshipments in a
certain epoch within the period. Das (1975) argues
optimality of base stock conserving (BSC) transfer
rules. Under a BSC transshipment, the excess stock of
one location (over its base stock level) is transshipped
to another location (if it has a shortage with respect to
its base stock level). Tagaras (1989) considers a sim-
ilar model but restricts transshipment epoch to the
end of a period. Robinson (1990) and Tagaras (1999)
extend earlier studies to multilocation environments.
Robinson (1990) shows the optimality of a myopic
base stock policy for the case of identical retailers.
Our basic difference from these papers is that the
locations in our model make their decisions indepen-
dently, rather than seeking to achieve a joint objective
function.
A more general body of related literature is on
risk pooling, though the ideas here are more spe-
cific. Nevertheless, we use the risk-pooling notions of
Eppen and Schrage (1981) in our computational anal-
ysis for benchmarking the benefits introduced by the
proposed model. A more recent paper that explicitly
considers centralization with risk pooling is Cherikh
(2000). In Cherikh (2000), risk pooling is achieved by a
limited transshipment policy, in a way resembling our
proposal, under a multifacility newsvendor setting.
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Another related direction of research is the coordi-
nation issues of decentralized supply chains. Most of
these papers consider incentive schemes between the
supplier and the retailer(s) to achieve the centralized
solution (see, for example, Cachon and Zipkin 1999,
Chen 1999, Lee and Whang 1999, Cachon 2001).
Game-theoretic consumer choice models, as they
impose an interaction among retailers, are related
to stock transfer models that we investigate. Parlar
(1988) considers two substitutable products, where
excess demand for an item is directed to other item’s
stock. Parlar (1988) proves the existence and unique-
ness of the Nash solution in a single-period setting.
Wang and Parlar (1994) extend Parlar (1988) to a
three-product case. Avsar and Gursoy (2002) consider
a multiperiod extension of Parlar (1988), and show the
existence of a myopic Nash solution (within the class
of stationary policies) for the infinite horizon case.
In Lippman and McCardle (1997), industry demand
for an item is allocated across locations using spe-
cific splitting rules. After the allocation of demand,
excess demand is reallocated in a way similar to
Parlar (1988). They characterize the Nash equilibrium
of inventory levels and show that it is unique under
certain conditions. Mahajan and van Ryzin (2001)
analyze a system where consumers choose dynami-
cally from the available products based on a utility
maximization criterion. They show that competition
among locations leads to overstocking, which in the
limit, becomes so excess that the individual profits of
locations approach to zero. We differ from the con-
sumer choice models reviewed above in two impor-
tant aspects. In the above-mentioned articles, excess
demand is transferred across locations, whereas we
consider the transfer of stock. Also, the transfer of
demand from one location to another occurs after the
realization of demand (with respect to a single order-
up-to level computed at the beginning of a single
period), whereas in our model, we consider the trans-
fer of stock after the occurrence of the supplier lead
time demand, but before the realization of retailer
lead time demand is observed. Therefore, in our anal-
ysis, the stock position (right before the realization of
retailer lead time demand) of a retailer is not only
affected by the excess demand in the other retailer,
but also affected by the occurrence of shortage (with
respect to retailer lead time order-up-to level).
In a recent paper by Rudi et al. (2001), consider
a two-retailer decentralized model with transship-
ment of stock. The authors aim to find transshipment
prices for which the joint decentralized profit achieves
the centralized system profit. Anupindi et al. (2001)
employ a general framework with N retailers. Each
location makes independent inventory decision (how
much to stock), demands are observed, and then loca-
tions jointly determine the shipment decision (how to
allocate the excess demand). For the inventory deci-
sion, Anupindi et al. (2001) develop conditions for the
existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. They
also show that there exists an allocation mechanism
for the decentralized system that achieves the central-
ized solution. Both the motivation and the analysis of
this paper differ from these papers in the following
respects. In our work, we model a system differenti-
ated by (possibly long) lead times that are observed
both prior and after the transfer of stock occurs.
Therefore, as well as the determination of the trans-
fer (or allocation of stock) decision that occurs after
the realization of supplier lead time, and the deter-
mination of the inventory decision that precedes the
supplier lead time, we are also interested in the conse-
quences of these decisions in the posttransfer periods
(through the retailer lead time). As mentioned in §1,
a cross-docking distribution system, where the replen-
ishment cycle is decomposed into to warehouse and
from warehouse lead times provides a good example.
In such a case, not only the inventory decision at the
beginning of the cycle but also the revised decision
at some epoch within the cycle becomes important.
The managers of the retailers are interested in the
impact of their inventory and transfer decisions with
respect to the order-up-to levels computed relative to
the retailer shipment times. In our analysis, we derive
and employ the distribution of net change in the stock
position of a retailer as a function of both the original
order-up-to levels and order-up-to levels relative to
retailer shipment times. This distribution enables us
to analyze important system dynamics with respect
to essential system characteristics.
3. Description of the Mathematical
Model
In this section, we present our mathematical model.
We choose to describe the details using a single order
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cycle to ease the exposition. Notation and basic defi-
nitions are laid out in §3.1. Note that we use notation
and definitions suitable for the stationary problem.
In §3.2, we derive the expected cost function of a
retailer. In §3.3, we introduce the general periodic
review model, and state and discuss the conditions
under which the single cycle analysis will hold for the
stationary problem. These conditions are mild, as will
be observed in §3.3.
3.1. Preliminaries and Notation
The system is comprised of a supplier and two retail-
ers. Suppose time is divided into periods of unit
length. Let L ∈ 12    be the length of the sup-
plier lead time, and li ∈ 012    be the length of
the retailer lead time for retailer i 	i = 12
. For the
cross-docking example of §1, L represents the trans-
portation time of shipping goods from the supplier
to the cross-docking warehouse, and li represents the
time it takes to ship goods from the warehouse to
the retailer. We define Di t as the demand observed at
retailer i in period t, and we let Di	k
 be the generic
continuous random variable denoting total demand
occurring at retailer i 	i = 12
 over k periods 	k =
12   
. Although we assume that retailer demands
are independent through time and across retailers,
in §4, we argue that this restriction can be relaxed.
Let F 	k
i 	x
 be the distribution function for Di	k
. We
assume that F 	1
i 	x
 is continuously differentiable and
strictly increasing on the support 	0
 with no mass
at x = 0. Our results would hold for distribution func-
tions over a finite support as well. Let f 	k
i 	x
 be the
density function of Di	k
.
At the beginning of a period (denoted as the first
period for notational convenience), retailer i places an
order at the supplier to raise its inventory position
to level Si 	i = 12
. When retailers determine their
order-up-to levels, inventory decision of one retailer
depends on the other. Therefore, for a given inventory
decision S2 of retailer 2, the optimal inventory level
of retailer 1 is denoted as S∗1 	S2
. To simplify the nota-
tion, we suppress the dependency of S∗1 (and of S
∗
2 ) on
the other retailer’s decision, and use S∗i to denote the
optimal value for Si whenever appropriate.
For each retailer, we focus on a replenishment cycle
of length L + li + 1, as the impact of the inventory
decision made at the beginning of the cycle affects
inventory-related costs of a retailer at the end of
period L + li + 1. At the beginning of period L + 1,
each retailer has its own ideal inventory position that
it would like to achieve to minimize respective hold-
ing and backorder costs to be incurred at the end of
period L+ li+1. Let Z1 and Z2 be these ideal levels for
retailers 1 and 2, respectively. We denote the holding
and backorder costs associated with retailer i as hi > 0
and bi > 0 	i = 12
, respectively.
3.2. Development of the Expected Cost Functions
We first derive the ideal stock position, Zi, that
retailer i would like to attain at the beginning
of period L + 1. To compute Zi, we concentrate
on demands occurring in periods L + 1L + 2    
L+li+1: simply, Zi is the base stock level for an inven-
tory system where the response time are the periods
L + 1L + 2    L + li + 1. Let Gi	z
 be the expected
single-period cost observed at retailer i, given that the
inventory position at the beginning of period L + 1

















 is strictly convex (by assumptions
imposed on F 	li+1
i 	x
), the optimal inventory position










For notational convenience, define
i = Si −Zi (3)
Let Ai and Bi be the random variables denoting excess
and shortfall inventory for retailer i relative to Zi at
the end of period L (before any reallocation decision):







+ = max0x. Note that realizations of Ai
and Bi cannot be both positive. We define random
variables 1 and 2 as follows:
1 = amount that can be transferred from retailer 2
to retailer 1
= minB1A2
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2 = amount that can be transferred from retailer 1
to retailer 2
= minB2A1
We define Xi as the net change in the stock position






We note that 1 and 2 cannot be both positive and
both X1 and X2 are functions of S1 and S2 (actually,
of 1 and 2, but Z1 and Z2 can be found by Equa-
tion (2)). We define Ci	S1 S2
 as the expected inven-
tory holding and backorder costs of retailer i at the
end of period L+ li + 1:
Ci	S1 S2
= E Gi	Si −Xi
! (4)
where the expectation is taken over Xi. Because
retailer i would like to get as close to its 	li + 1
-
period optimal inventory position Zi after any trans-
fer occurs, intuitively, for any given Sj (j = i), Si that
minimizes (4) should be bounded below by Zi. We
formalize this observation for retailer 1 in the fol-
lowing proposition (the argument for retailer 2 is the
same).
Proposition 1. Let S∗1 	S2
 be the minimizer of
C1	S1 S2
 over S1 for a given value of S2. Then,
S∗1 	S2
≥Z1.
Proof. Proof is provided in the appendix. 
By Proposition 1, we may limit our analysis to non-
negative i. Then, Xi ≥ 0 for i = 12. Let Hi	x
 be the
distribution function of Xi 	i = 12










 is a function of both S1 and S2.
3.3. Stationary Problem: Infinitely Many
Order Cycles
Although in this paper we consider a single replen-
ishment cycle, our development can be used as an
approximation for the stationary multicycle prob-
lem. In what follows, we present an analysis of the
multicycle problem, and show that the expected cost
function developed in §3.2 (specifically, Equation (5))
is still valid under an additional assumption. The dif-
ficulty in extending the single-cycle analysis to multi-
ple order cycles is because of the possibility of transfer
of stock during the supplier lead time (which affects
inventory positions). Stock transfers during the sup-
plier lead time would essentially change the random
variable Xi (and its distribution function Hi	x
) in
Equation (4), making the computation of the average
cost per period very difficult, if not impossible. There-
fore, for approximating the average cost per period of
the multicycle problem by using (5), we propose an
order adjustment rule (details presented below), at the
expense of an assumption on the order quantities. The
order adjustment rule states that the retailer orders
that are outstanding at the supplier can be modified
(without changing the total order size) dynamically.
Assume that the periods are numbered 012   
and assume a supplier lead time L ∈ 12   . We
assume that the following sequence of events occurs
for every period t:
(1) Orders placed in period t−L arrive at the cross-
docking warehouse, ready to be shipped to retailers,
(2) State of the system is observed,
(3) A possible transfer of stock is realized,
(4) Orders arrive at the retailers (this allows the
possibility that li = 0; in that case, right after a possi-
ble transfer of stock at the cross-docking warehouse
the possibly modified order arrives at retailer i),
(5) Each retailer places its order at the supplier,
(6) Demand occurs, and
(7) Holding and backorder costs are incurred at the
retailers.
Let S1 and S2 be stationary order-up-to levels for
retailers 1 and 2, respectively. We use the following
additional notation to facilitate the presentation.
• Ii t : “Partial” inventory position of retailer i in
period t right before a possible transfer of stock. The
“partial” inventory position of retailer i in a period t
is defined as the on-hand stock minus backorders
plus the orders that will arrive at the retailer in peri-
ods t t + 1     t + li. This includes the order just
made ready at the cross-docking warehouse, and the
orders in the pipeline between the warehouse and the
retailer. However, the outstanding orders at the cross-
docking warehouse are excluded.
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• I ′i t : “Partial” inventory position of retailer i in
period t right after a possible transfer of stock.
• i t : Amount transferred from retailer j = i to
retailer i in period t.
• Oi t s : Status in period s of the order placed by
retailer i in period t, s = t     t + L − 1. Oi t t is the
size of the order placed in period t by retailer i. When
L ≥ 2, we allow that the order placed by the retailer
can be modified in later periods. Consequently, let
Oi t t+1    Oi t t+L−1 denote the sizes after a possible
change in the periods t + 1     t +L− 1.
• Di t : Demand at retailer i in period t.
We also define a “complete” inventory position,
which is the on-hand stock minus backorders plus
all goods that are on order, including the orders
outstanding at the warehouse. Notice that for L= 1,
the “partial” and “complete” inventory position right
before a possible transfer of stock are identical. With-
out loss of generality, we assume that the initial
“complete” inventory position of retailer i does not
exceed Si. The state of the system at the beginning
period t = 01     right before a possible transfer of
stock, is described by the vector(
I1 tO1 t−L+1 t−1    O1 t−1 t−1
I2 tO2 t−L+1 t−1    O2 t−1 t−1
)

provided that at time t = 0, Ii0 and Ois−1 are given
for i = 12, and s = −L + 1    −1. For L = 1, the
state of the system reduces to 	I1 t I2 t
. Note that
Oi t−L+1 t−1 is the status (after possible modifications),
at the end of period t − 1, of the order placed by
retailer i in period t − L + 1. This order is because
of the arrival at the cross-docking warehouse at the
beginning of period t + 1. For t = 01     after the
orders placed by the retailers in period t−L (O1 t−L t−1
and O2 t−L t−1) arrive at the warehouse (Step 1 in
the event list), and after the state of the system is
observed (Step 2 in the event list), a possible transfer
of stock occurs by the amounts
1 t =min	I2 t −Z2
+ 	Z1− I1 t
+ (6)
2 t =min	I1 t −Z1
+ 	Z2− I2 t
+ (7)
which changes inventory positions of retailers to post-
transfer levels,
I ′1 t = I1 t +1 t −2 t (8)
I ′2 t = I2 t +2 t −1 t  (9)
Equations (6)–(9) are valid under the assumption that
orders O1 t−L t−1 and O2 t−L t−1 being present at the
warehouse at the moment are large enough. This
assumption is similar to the “sufficient stock” assump-
tion, commonly employed in multiechelon inventory
theory (see, for example, Eppen and Schrage 1981).
The sufficient stock assumption ensures that there is
enough stock (say, O1 t−L t−1) to realize the transfer of
stock. We state our main result regarding the station-
ary problem in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1. The average cost per period of a retailer in
a multiple order cycle setting is obtained by the expected
cost of a single cycle (given by Equation (4)) under the
assumption that order sizes are always sufficient to ensure
feasibility of a stock transfer (the sufficient stock assump-
tion described above).
Proof. It is sufficient to show that for any t =
12     “partial” inventory positions of a retailer,
right before and after the transfer of stock (that is,
Ii t and I ′i t) are given by Ii t = Si − Di	L
 and I ′i t =
Si −Xi. We distinguish the cases L = 1 and L ≥ 2. We
first consider the case L = 1. By the orders placed
in a period t − 1, the “complete” inventory positions
of the retailers are increased up to the order-up-to
levels Si (this is always possible), and in period t,
we obtain “partial” inventory positions right after a
possible transfer of stock as given by Equations (8)
and (9). These inventory positions determine the costs
for retailer i at the end of period t + li, i = 12. It
is easily verified that, in expectation, these costs are
equal to the costs Ci	S1 S2
 as described in the single-
cycle analysis in §3.2, Equation (4) (Ii t = Si − Di t−1,
and thus i t is stochastically equal to i of the sin-
gle cycle analysis). So the single cycle analysis applies
in this case. The more complicated case L ≥ 2 is pre-
sented in the appendix. 
4. Distribution of the Net Change in
Inventory Position
As stated by Equation (5), if we can derive the dis-
tribution of Xi, then the expected cost functions pos-
sibly the optimal policy parameters can be obtained.
Proposition 2 characterizes the distribution function
for Xi.
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Proof. The result is established by first condition-
ing on D1	L
 and then by using the distributions of Ai
and Bi. Details are provided in the appendix. 
The distribution of X2, H2	x
, is symmetric and
obtained by interchanging indices 1 and 2 wherever







































well defined by the assumptions imposed on F 	1
1 	x
).
Closer inspection of H1	x
 reveals that H1	x
 is con-





























The jump at x =1 characterizes the probability mass
for which retailer 1 can achieve its best 	l1+1
-period
order-up-to level Z1 through transfer of retailer orders




 gives the probability that
a transfer of stock occurs between retailers 1 and 2.
















This is simply the probability that one retailer will be
above and the other retailer will be below their corre-
sponding ideal stocking points. If retailers are identi-




, then the probability that
a transfer of stock occurs cannot exceed 0.5 (in this
case, P	12
 is concave and attains its maximum
at 0.5).
Limiting cases for H1	x
 can be obtained by letting
2 →  (ample stock in retailer 2, that can be used
to satisfy any shortfall of retailer 1) and for 2 = 0
(retailer 2 is willing to receive any excess of retailer 1).
In deriving Hi	x
, we assumed that the demands
occurring at retailers 1 and 2 are independent.
This restriction can easily be relaxed. When retailer
demands are correlated, H1	x
 is affected only





2 	x  y
 as the distribution of D2	L
 conditioned on
D1	L
 = y. Then, using similar steps as in proof of





























5. Equilibrium Order-up-to Levels
Under Transfer of Stock
In §3.2, we argued that the expected cost function







 is given by Proposition 2.
Given that there is an opportunity of stock transfer
at the cross-docking warehouse, the retailers would
determine their initial order-up-to levels S1 and S2
by considering the order-up-to level decision of each
other. Our aim in this section is to show the existence
of the unique equilibrium.
We can outline major results that we present in
this section as follows: By Theorem 1.2 of Fudenberg
and Tirole (1991), a Nash equilibrium for retailers 1
and 2 exists whenever (1) the action space for retail-
ers (that is, set of values 	S1 S2
) is nonempty and
compact, (2) Ci	S1 S2
 is continuous in 	S1 S2
, and
(3) Ci	S1 S2
 is convex in Si for a given Sj 	j = i
. In
Theorem 1, we establish continuity and convexity of
Ci	S1 S2
 on a compact subset of R2. This proves the
existence of a Nash solution. In Theorem 2, we pro-
vide the solution for the unique Nash equilibrium.
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Theorem 1. (i) Ci	S1 S2
 is continuous in 	S1 S2
 on
the action space , =  Z1 S1! ×  Z2 S2!, where Si is
obtained by solving F 	L
j ∗ F 	L+li+1
i 	 Si
= bi/	bi +hi
, i j =
12, i = j .
(ii) Ci	S1 S2
 is strictly convex in Si for a given value
of Sj , i j = 12, i = j .
(iii) The optimal order-up-to level for retailer i
	i = 12
, S∗i 	Sj 
 for a given Sj 	j = i













= −bi + 	hi + bi
Hi ∗ F 	li+1
i 	Si
= 0
Proof. The proof is provided in the appendix. 




, is found as the unique solution of the follow-
ing equations:












Proof. The proof is provided in the appendix. 
6. Computational Results
In this section, we present and discuss our numerical
findings. Our main focus of inquiry will span
(1) the behavior of the equilibrium solution (given
by Theorem 2) and corresponding expected costs with
respect to essential system parameters,
(2) improvement of the proposed model (in terms
of costs and safety stocks) relative to the decentralized
model without stock transfer, and
(3) system performance relative to centralized
model.
In our numerical study, the random demand faced
by retailer i in a period is normally distributed with
mean 2i and variance 32i . We set h1 = h2 = 1 and
use b1 = b2 ∈ 4919 (corresponding to service lev-
els 0809095), respectively. The mean demand for
retailer 1 is fixed at 21 = 100, and 22 is set to either 100
or 200. We let cvi = 3i/2i to assume either 0.05 or 0.25,
i = 12. The supplier lead time is set to L = 5, and
the retailer lead time takes either li = 1 or li = 3 for
i = 12. We used numerical integration procedures of
Maple 8 for solving the optimal order-up-to levels and
evaluating expected costs.
Through our experiments, we computed and
recorded the following policy parameters and perfor-
mance measures:
• S indi : Order-up-to level for retailer i, given that
they place their orders independently, without the












• C indi : Expected cost incurred by retailer i if it
operates with the order-up-to level S indi
C indi = hiE 	S indi −Di	L+ li + 1

+!
+ biE 	Di	L+ li + 1
− S indi 
+!
• S∗i : Order-up-to level for retailer i under pro-
posed model (given by Theorem 2).
• Zi: Order-up-to level for retailer i over the retailer




: Minimum expected cost incurred at
retailer i under proposed model (given by Equa-
tion (5)).
• %Ci: Percentage improvement gained for re-
tailer i over the decentralized model
%Ci =




• %TC: Percent improvement gained over the total

















• The safety stock for retailer i under decentralized
model with stock transfer can be defined as SSi = S∗i −
	L+ li+1
2i. Similarly, SS indi = S indi −	L+ li+1
2i is the
safety stock for retailer i for the decentralized model
without stock transfer. Then, the percentage reduction
in terms of safety stocks can be calculated as
%SSi =
S indi − S∗i
S indi − 	L+ li + 1
2i
× 100















i	L+ li + 1
2i
× 100
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Table 1 Summary Results for Identical Retailers





















i = 5 4 7094 7111 206.0 1,417.9 94 111 159 186 160 297
li = 1 9 7143 7170 209.1 1,427.2 143 170 199 232 203 372
19 7184 7218 211.6 1,434.9 184 218 235 273 241 438
i = 5 4 9112 9126 408.4 1,821.5 112 126 188 210 189 357
li = 3 9 9171 9192 412.8 1,832.7 171 192 236 263 238 447
19 9220 9247 416.4 1,841.9 220 247 278 309 282 526
i = 25 4 7469 7557 229.8 1,489.3 469 557 794 926 800 1485
li = 1 9 7715 7848 245.3 1,535.9 715 848 997 1161 1015 1861
19 7920 8088 258.2 1,574.5 920 1088 1179 1364 1207 2188
i = 25 4 9560 9631 442.1 1,907.3 560 631 941 1050 945 1784
li = 3 9 9855 9961 464.1 1,963.4 855 961 1182 1316 1192 2237
19 1
0099 1
0234 482.2 2,009.7 1099 1234 1391 1547 1409 2629
• P	12
: Probability that a transfer of stock
occurs between retailers.
In §6.1, we present our major observations regarding
the behavior of the performance measures and the
improvement of the model that we propose over the
decentralized model. In §6.2, we present comparisons
with the centralized model. Finally, in §6.3, we inves-
tigate the benefits that would be observed if retailers
operate with the order-up-to levels dictated by the
decentralized model, but apply transfer of stock.
Table 1 summarizes our computational results for
symmetric retailers (21 = 22 = 100, 31 = 32 ∈ 525,
b1 = b2 ∈ 4919, l1 = l2 ∈ 13). In Table 2, we
present several percent measures for the performance
of the proposed model. Columns for %SS and %TC
Table 2 Performance of the Proposed Policy for Identical Retailers
bi %SS %SScen %TC %POL %D %B
i = 5 4 16.0 4.8 14.4 95.2 6.9 72.2
li = 1 9 15.5 5.4 14.1 89.1 7.2 70.8
19 15.2 5.7 13.9 83.0 7.3 70.4
i = 5 4 11.3 4.4 10.4 96.4 5.5 69.1
li = 3 9 11.1 4.6 10.2 92.5 5.7 67.7
19 11.0 4.7 10.1 88.0 5.8 67.4
i = 25 4 15.8 5.0 14.3 95.1 6.9 72.0
li = 1 9 15.6 5.3 14.1 89.1 7.2 71.0
19 15.4 5.5 13.6 84.8 7.8 68.6
i = 25 4 11.3 4.4 10.3 96.6 5.5 68.7
li = 3 9 11.1 4.7 10.2 92.4 5.6 68.1
19 10.9 4.9 10.1 88.2 5.8 67.3
would give us percent improvement in safety stocks
and expected total costs over the decentralized model,
respectively. In Tables 3 and 4, we present our results
for unidentical retailers. As the number of such cases
is large, we present a representative subset (21 = 100,
22 = 200, b1 = b2 = 4). Some of the columns in the
tables will subsequently be explained. Tables contain-
ing all the computational results can be provided by
the authors upon request.
6.1. Main Observations
Main observations drawn from our experiments can
be summarized as follows:
(1) For the parameter set that we use, we always









i for i =
12. Percent cost improvement gained by employ-
ing the proposed model, %Ci, can be as high as 22%
for a retailer (see Table 4). On the other hand, total
cost improvement over the decentralized model with-
out stock transfer, %TC, can be as high as 14% (see
Table 2). Percent improvement in the safety stocks for
a retailer, %SSi, can be as high as 33% (see Table 3).
Similarly, total safety stock improvement can be as
high as 16%. Please note that in Table 2, columns
corresponding to %TC and %SS would also give
us improvements for individual retailers, as in these
cases retailers are identical.
(2) We observe that as 31 gets close to 32,
%TC increases. Intuitively, given that one retailer ends
up above and the other retailer ends up below its
respective Zi value at the end of supplier lead time,
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Table 3 Stocking Levels and Percent Improvements for 1 = 100, 2 = 200, b1 = b2 = 4
Percent














2 %SS1 %SS2 %SS
1 = 5 	1
1 708.5 1,420.2 711.1 1,422.3 206.0 411.9 85 202 11.1 223 234 91 139
2 = 10 	1
3 709.0 1,823.2 711.1 1,825.2 206.0 816.8 90 232 11.1 252 187 82 114
	3
1 910.1 1,420.6 912.6 1,422.3 408.4 411.9 101 206 12.6 223 200 73 119
	3
3 910.2 1,823.8 912.6 1,825.2 408.4 816.8 102 238 12.6 252 191 59 103
1 = 5 	1
1 707.4 1,509.2 711.1 1,511.3 206.0 459.5 74 1092 11.1 1113 334 19 48
2 = 50 	1
3 708.1 1,926.2 711.1 1,926.2 206.0 884.2 81 1262 11.1 1262 271 00 22
	3
1 909.1 1,509.6 912.6 1,511.3 408.4 459.5 91 1096 12.6 1113 279 16 43
	3
3 909.9 1,924.4 912.6 1,926.2 408.4 884.2 99 1244 12.6 1262 218 15 33
1 = 25 	1
1 751.4 1,416.8 755.7 1,422.3 229.8 411.9 514 168 55.7 223 77 245 125
2 = 10 	1
3 752.2 1,819.9 755.7 1,825.2 229.8 816.8 522 199 55.7 252 61 211 108
	3
1 958.8 1,417.9 963.1 1,422.3 442.1 411.9 588 179 63.1 223 69 196 102
	3
3 959.6 1,821.0 963.1 1,825.2 442.1 816.8 596 210 63.1 252 55 169 88
1 = 25 	1
1 742.9 1,501.2 755.7 1,511.3 229.8 459.5 429 1012 55.7 1113 229 91 137
2 = 50 	1
3 745.5 1,915.9 755.7 1,926.2 229.8 884.2 455 1159 55.7 1262 182 82 113
	3
1 950.7 1,503.2 963.1 1,511.3 442.1 459.5 507 1032 63.1 1113 197 73 118
	3
3 953.2 1,917.9 963.1 1,926.2 442.1 884.2 532 1179 63.1 1262 158 66 96
respective excess and shortfall quantities will be close
to each other. Therefore the likelihood that both of
the retailers will get close to their respective Zi val-
ues will increase. We observe the same behavior for
the safety stock improvements. Our model leads to
higher improvements in total safety stocks whenever
retailers are more symmetric. Consequently, highest




























2  %C1 %C2 %TC
1 = 5 	1
1 15.1 335 185 370 15.4 335 182 95 124
2 = 10 	1
3 15.2 390 185 420 15.4 390 180 71 104
	3
1 18.2 335 210 370 18.4 336 133 95 109
	3
3 18.2 391 210 420 18.4 391 131 70 90
1 = 5 	1
1 14.4 1806 185 1852 14.7 1803 224 25 43
2 = 50 	1
3 14.4 2061 185 2100 14.7 2058 221 18 35
	3
1 17.6 1806 210 1852 17.9 1804 162 25 39
	3
3 17.6 2061 210 2100 17.8 2060 160 18 31
1 = 25 	1
1 85.0 299 926 370 85.0 305 81 192 113
2 = 10 	1
3 85.1 361 926 420 85.1 366 81 140 99
	3
1 98.6 300 1050 370 98.6 304 61 189 94
	3
3 98.7 362 1050 420 98.7 365 60 138 82
1 = 25 	1
1 75.7 1675 926 1852 77.0 1676 182 95 124
2 = 50 	1
3 75.9 1951 926 2100 76.8 1952 180 71 104
	3
1 91.0 1677 1050 1852 92.0 1678 133 95 109
	3
3 91.2 1953 1050 2100 91.9 1954 131 70 90
values for total improvement (%TC or %SS) can be
observed in Table 2.
On the other hand, highest improvement in the
expected cost of a retailer, %Ci, occurs when retailers
are highly unbalanced (for example, %C1 = 224% and
%C2 = 25% for 21 = 100, 22 = 200, 31 = 5, 32 = 50,
b1 = b2 = 4, l1 = l2 = 1 in Table 4). Moreover, in these
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cases, we observed that the retailer with lower stan-
dard deviation of demand gains higher improvement.
In Table 4, retailer 1 gains relatively higher improve-
ment as 31/32 ratio decreases. Similarly, as one would
expect, these cases also coincide with the cases where
one of the retailers gain high saving in terms of safety
stocks (for the example above, %SS1 = 334%, %SS2 =
19%), as observed in Table 3. The retailer with higher
standard deviation of demand is expected to show
higher deviation from its Zi value at the end of the
supplier lead time. Consequently, the retailer with
lower standard deviation has a higher chance of cor-
recting its shortfall or excess by transfer of stock from
the former, and hence can retain lower stock levels.
(3) We observed that the amount of improvement
in safety stocks or total costs mainly depends on the
relative variability between retailers, rather than the
absolute value of variabilities. In Table 2, we observe
that the rows corresponding to 3i = 5 and 3i = 25
are almost identical with respect to %SS and %TC.
Similarly, in Tables 3 and 4 rows corresponding to
cases 31 = 5, 32 = 10 and 31 = 25, 32 = 50 yield almost
identical %Ci and %SSi values. Although we do not
have an analytical proof, this led us to believe that
there is an approximate linear relation (as in a single
stock point model) between the standard deviation
of demand and performance measures of a retailer
(such as Ci	S1 S2
 ≈ 3i × constant and safety stocki ≈
3i × constant).
(4) Total cost improvement, %TC or improvement
for a retailer, %Ci, also depend on the retailer lead
time parameters. As retailer lead times increase,
%TC decreases. This effect is expected, as in the cases
of higher retailer lead times the relative length of
risk-pooling period, L, over the length of the cycle
decreases. These are observed both in Tables 2–4.
Notice that in Table 3, both %SS1 and %SS decrease
as we move from 	l1 l2
 = 	11





. A similar observation holds in
Table 4 for %TC and %C1. Obviously, the supplier
lead time, L, also has an effect on the performance of
our policy. In our experiments, supplier lead time is
fixed as L = 5. We also computed cases where L= 7,
and observed that the performance of our model
improves, as expected.
(5) We observe a decrease in %TC and %SS as unit
backorder cost increases (see, for example, Table 2).
Table 5 Transfer of Stock Probabilities
cv1 = 005
bi = 4 bi = 9 bi = 19
l1 = 1 l1 = 3 l1 = 1 l1 = 3 l1 = 1 l1 = 3
cv2 = 005
2 = 100 l2 = 1 0.471 0.477 0.434 0.449 0.395 0.418
l2 = 3 0.477 0.481 0.449 0.456 0.418 0.429
2 = 200 l2 = 1 0.474 0.482 0.440 0.459 0.404 0.435
l2 = 3 0.476 0.484 0.444 0.458 0.409 0.432
cv2 = 025
2 = 100 l2 = 1 0.478 0.487 0.449 0.472 0.418 0.454
l2 = 3 0.476 0.484 0.446 0.463 0.412 0.440
2 = 200 l2 = 1 0.482 0.492 0.455 0.477 0.426 0.463
l2 = 3 0.477 0.485 0.448 0.466 0.415 0.445
Although there is no clear intuition as to why this
phenomena is observed, in what follows, we provide
a plausible explanation.
One can check from Table 1 that as b increases, the
increase in Zi is smaller than the increase in S∗i . There-
fore, as b increases, the gap between S∗i and Zi (which
was defined as i in Equation (3)) increases. One can
also check that in all the cases in Table 1 i > 500, and
hence F 	L
1 	1
 > 05 (since 21 = 22 = 100 and L = 5).
Hence, for the parameter sets presented, it becomes
more likely for the retailers to end up above their
respective Zi values at the end of supplier lead time,
and occurrence of transfer of stock becomes less likely.
Because retailers do not use the advantage of stock
transfer (as frequently as before), the improvement of
our model deteriorates.
This phenomena can be observed in Table 5, where
we present P	12
 values for the parameter sets
used in our computations. For the parameter sets that
we used, P	12
 values range from 0.395 to 0.492. It
can be observed that as b increases (for both retailers),
P	12
 decreases.
Of course, these observations would have been dif-




’s) were located dif-
ferently. Therefore we conclude that the behavior of
our model’s performance with respect to a change
in b depends on the location of corresponding i
values.
6.2. Comparison with the Centralized Model
Obviously, the total expected cost incurred by retailers
would attain its minimum when the system operates
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in a centralized manner. That is, instead of retailers
individually determining their order-up-to levels S∗1
and S∗2 , a systemwide order-up-to level Scen is deter-
mined. Then, at the end of the supplier lead time,
a decision is made on how much stock to allocate
for each retailer. To understand how close our pol-
icy gets (in terms of systemwide expected cost) to
the centralized model, we devised an experiment to
compare the performance of our model against the
performance of the centralized supply chain. We only
considered cases where 31 = 32 and l1 = l2. Essen-
tially, for the centralized model, this corresponds to
the two-echelon model of Eppen and Schrage (1981).
In Table 1, we present systemwide expected cost for
the centralized model in the column TCcen, and the
systemwide order-up-to level in the column Scen. We
define %D as the percent deviation (in terms of sys-












We report %D figures in Table 2. It can be observed
that for the cases that we considered, the deviation of
the total cost of our model from the centralized solu-
tion is no more than 78%. This deviation decreases as
li increases, and increases as b increases, as one would
expect. In Table 2, we present the percent deviation
of the proposed model from the centralized model
in terms of total safety stocks in the column %SScen









i	L+ li + 1
2i
× 100
Both the proposed model and the centralized model
take advantage of correcting shortfall and excess stock
situations that occur during the supplier lead time.
Therefore, as the weight of the supplier lead time in
the overall cycle time decreases, their performance get
close to each other. On the other hand, the centralized
model gets even better as the backorder cost increases.
We should keep in mind that the centralized model
has the advantage of delaying any allocation of stock
during the supplier lead time, whereas in the pro-
posed model, each retailer determines its order-up-to
level at the beginning of the order cycle. Moreover, in
the centralized model, an allocation that favors one
of the retailers, but deteriorates the other can be per-
formed, as it tries to minimize systemwide costs. In
the proposed model, on the other hand, a possible
backorder occurrence will be avoided through a trans-
fer of stock only if the transfer improves the perfor-
mances of both.
We define %B as the percent benefits of central-
ization (over the decentralized model without stock


















The last column of Table 2 illustrates that approxi-
mately 70% of the benefits of the centralized model
over the decentralized model can be obtained by
employing our model. Therefore, a decentralized
model operating under the prescribed optimal order-
up-to levels and the transfer policy proposed can
explain almost 70% of the improvement that would
have been obtained by a centralized model.
6.3. Understanding the Source of Improvement
The policy that we propose has two major sources
that lead to improvement over the decentralized
model. The first source of improvement is the pos-
sibility of stock transfer. The second source, on the
other hand, is the utilization of the other retailer’s
inventory decision in making a decision on one’s
order-up-to level: the Nash equilibrium. Therefore, in






 into two parts. Although we do not have
exact means for differentiating these two sources,
we utilized the following approach to come up with
approximate measures of them. If retailers obtain their
order-up-to levels by using Equation (11), but do
experience transfer of stock at the end of supplier




i = 12. Therefore, an approximate measure for the
improvement because of the transfer of stock, POLi,
is given as
POLi =C indi −Ci	S ind1  S ind2 

We define %POLi as the percent improvement
because of transfer of stock
%POLi =
C indi −Ci	S ind1  S ind2 

C indi −Ci	S∗1 S∗2 

× 100
Güllü, van Houtum, Sargut, and Erkip: Analysis of a Decentralized Supply Chain Under Partial Cooperation
242 Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 7(3), pp. 229–247, © 2005 INFORMS
Table 6 Percent Cost Improvement for Retailer 1











10 757 81.9 76.5 829
	5
50 719 79.8 72.6 804
	25
10 1000 99.8 99.0 925
	25
50 757 81.9 76.6 1000
We present Ci	S ind1  S
ind
2 
 values in Table 1 and
%POL1 =%POL2 =%POL values in Table 2 for iden-
tical retailers. One can observe that %POL decreases
as the unit backorder cost increases. The explana-
tion of the behavior of %POL, as b changes, parallels
our explanation of %TC (Item 5 of §6.1): transfer
of stock becomes less likely. On the other hand,
%POL decreases as the retailer lead time increases.
As noted in Item 4 of §6.1, percent improvement
of the proposed policy decreases as li increases,
because of the decreasing weight of the risk-pooling
period 	L
 over the order cycle. We infer that in such
cases, determining the precise order-up-to level quan-
tities become less important. Therefore most of the
(already diminished) improvement stems from the
stock transfer.
In Table 6, we present %POL1 values for the case
21 = 100, 22 = 200, b1 = b2 = 19. As can be seen from
Table 6, 	1−%POL1
 values (approximately the per-
centage of improvement that comes from the equilib-
rium solution) are in the range of 15%–20% for most
of the cases.
7. Summary of Managerial
Implications and Conclusions
In this paper, we considered a decentralized supply
chain of two independent retailers (or manufactur-
ers) and a supplier. In the system that we analyzed,
retailers order a common product (or raw material)
from the supplier to fulfill their own random cus-
tomer demand. The supplier has ample capacity to
satisfy the orders placed by the retailers, but there is
a fixed lead time (supplier lead time) associated with
order preparation (because of supplier’s manufactur-
ing or ordering lead time, packaging, and loading
times at the supplier’s plant). At the end of the sup-
plier lead time, orders are shipped to retailers. Before
retailer orders are shipped, they are given an opportu-
nity to readjust their orders (by transferring part of an
order quantity from one retailer to the other), as long
as this transaction improves expected costs of both
retailers. Moreover, retailers share relevant informa-
tion (such as costs, demand distributions, inventory
levels) to be able to make a better informed decision
on order-up-to levels. Under this setting, we derived
unique equilibrium order-up-to levels for the retail-
ers. The derivation is based on a single-cycle analysis,
but can be generalized under some mild conditions,
as given in §3.3.
Our computational results gave us important man-
agerial insights on design and operation of such sys-
tems, some of which are summarized as follows:
(1) The model that we propose may lead to consid-
erable benefits in terms of expected costs and safety
stocks. Total safety stock improvement can be as high
as 16%, whereas total cost improvement can be as
much as 14%.
(2) The benefits are much higher for the retailer
with relatively smaller standard deviation of demand
(percent improvement in the safety stock may be as
high as 33%; percent improvement in cost may be as
much as 22%). Moreover, the retailer with the smaller
standard deviation increases its percent improvement
as the other retailer’s standard deviation gets higher.
(3) Benefits of the proposed model increase when-
ever the supplier lead time is long and the retailer
lead time is short.
(4) Combining the last two observations, a retailer
with reasonably low demand variation, having fast
transportation capability of shipping goods from the
cross-docking warehouse would be willing to partici-
pate in transfer of stock and information sharing.
(5) Expected total cost of the proposed model does
not show a considerable deviation from the central-
ized model.
(6) Approximately 70% of the expected cost ben-
efits of a centralized model can be gained from the
model that we propose. By applying the proposed
policy, a system can achieve a considerable percent of
the performance of a centralized model without sac-
rificing the individual performance of a retailer.
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(7) Around 80% of the cost improvement is because
of the transfer of stock at the cross-docking warehouse
and the remaining 20% is attributed to the Nash equi-
librium. This is encouraging, as information sharing
may be more difficult then implementing the transfer
policy at the cross-docking warehouse.
Our work can be extended in several directions.
One possible extension is to consider more than two;
say, N retailers. The main difficulty is in defining a
policy for the transfer of stock at the cross-docking
warehouse. A simple transfer rule is to index retail-
ers in a cyclic order in such a way that whenever
retailer i has an excess, it is used to satisfy the short-
age of retailer i+ 1	modN
. In fact, under such well-
defined transfer rules, one can derive the distribution
of net change in the stock position, Hi	x
, much like
the derivation in §4.
Another potential extension is to consider fixed
retailer shipment and transfer costs. The form of the
optimal order-up-to levels under fixed costs asso-
ciated with supplier-to-retailer shipments and fixed
transfer costs is worthwhile to investigate. In our
analysis, we assumed an uncapacitated supplier.
Apparently, if the supply is limited, a rationing game
at the supplier, on top of the transfer game that we
considered should also be incorporated.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. It is sufficient to show that
C1	Z1 S2
 < C1	Z1 − 9S2
 for any 9 > 0. For S1 = Z1, we
have A1 = 0, B1 = D1	L
, and hence 2 = 0 and 1 =
minD1	L
A2. For S1 = Z1 − 9, we have A1 = 0, B1 =
D1	L









where X91 is the net change variable corresponding to S1 =
Z1−9. It can easily be verified that 0≤X1 ≤ 9+X91 for every










and hence, as there is at least one element in the sam-
ple space with the above holding as strict inequality,
C1	Z1 S2
 < C1	Z1− 9S2
.
Proof of Lemma 1 for L≥ 2. Consider Equations (6)–(9).
Suppose that 1 t > 0, and hence 2 t = 0. To compen-
sate the transfer of stock, retailers modify O1 t−L+1 t−1 and
O2 t−L+1 t−1 in the opposite direction. That is, O1 t−L+1 t−1
is decreased by 1 t , and O2 t−L+1 t−1 is increased by 1 t .
Practically, the transfer of stock is equivalent to a temporary
borrowing until the next orders arrive at the cross-docking
warehouse. Note that the “complete” inventory positions
remain the same under this rule of transfer of stock. Using
the convention described above, the orders placed in period
t −L+ 1 are modified as
O1 t−L+1 t =O1 t−L+1 t−1−1 t +2 t (A.1)
O2 t−L+1 t =O2 t−L+1 t−1−2 t +1 t (A.2)
with other orders in the state vector being unaffected:
Ois t =Ois t−1 i = 12 s = t −L+ 2     t − 1 (A.3)
Note that Equation (A.3) vanishes for L = 2. Equa-
tions (A.1)–(A.2) are valid under the assumption that the
orders O1 t−L+1 t−1 and O2 t−L+1 t−1 being present at the
warehouse at that moment are large enough, and O1 t−L t−1
and O2 t+L t−1 are large enough. If 1 t > 0 (and thus
2 t = 0), then it is required that 1 t ≤O2 t−L t−1 and 1 t ≤
O1 t−L+1 t−1. If 2 t > 0 (and thus 1 t = 0), then it is required
that 2 t ≤ O1 t−L t−1 and 2 t ≤ O2 t−L+1 t−1. This assump-
tion is similar to the “sufficient stock” assumption given
above. Note that in this case, the sufficient stock assumption
ensures that there is enough stock (say, O1 t−L+1 t−1) to raise
inventory positions of retailers to predetermined levels (by
transferring an amount of 1 t).
By using (8), (9), (A.1), and (A.2), we obtain the following:
I ′i t +Oi t−L+1 t = Ii t +Oi t−L+1 t−1
i = 12 t = 01     (A.4)
Combining (A.4) with (A.3) shows that the “complete”
inventory position of retailer i does not change under the
transfer of stock
I ′i t +
t−1∑
s=t−L+1




i = 12 t ≥ 0 (A.5)
Now, by (A.3), we find
Ois t =Ois t−1 = · · · =Ois s
i = 12 t ≥ 0 s = t −L+ 2     t − 1 (A.6)
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(with the convention that this equation vanishes if L = 2,
and Ois t =Ois−1 when t ≤ 2). Hence, (A.5) may be rewrit-
ten as
I ′i t +
t−1∑
s=t−L+1
Ois t = Ii t +
t−1∑
s=t−L+1
Ois s i = 12 t ≥ 0
Thus
Oi t t = Si −
(












 i = 12 t ≥ 0 (A.7)
Further, by (A.4), for the “partial” inventory position
we find
Ii t+1 = I ′i t +Oi t−L+1 t −Di t
= Ii t +Oi t−L+1 t−L+1−Di t i = 12 t ≥ 0 (A.8)


















= Si−Dit−1 i=12 t≥1 (A.9)
Next, by substitution of (A.9) into (A.7), we obtain
Oi t t =Di t−1 i = 12 t ≥ 1
Thus, under the specified rule of order modification, each
retailer orders the previous period’s demand (implying the
usual stationary order-up-to level policy). Therefore, by
using (A.7) and (A.9) for i = 12 and t ≥ L, we obtain
Ii t = Si −
t−1∑
s=t−L
Di s = Si −Di	L
 (A.10)
Then, by (6), (7), and (A.10),
Ii t −Zi = 	Si −Zi
−Di	L
=i −Di	L










+ t ≥ L
By (8), (9), and (A.10), we find
I ′1 t = I1 t +1 t −2 t = S1− 	D1	L
−1 t +2 t
 t ≥ L
I ′2 t = I2 t +2 t −1 t = S2− 	D2	L
−2 t +1 t
 t ≥ L
which is equivalent to Si −Xi 	i = 12
 in (4) and (5).
Proof of Proposition 2. We condition X1 on D1	L
:
PrX1 ≤ x = PrX1 ≤ xD1	L
≤1
+PrX1 ≤ xD1	L
 > 1 (A.11)











































PrB2 ≤ x− yf 	L
1 	y






The second and the fourth equalities are obtained by noting
that 1 = 0 and A1 = 1 − y on D1	L
 ≤ 1. For the second









































0 x < 1
∫ 
1
PrA2 ≥ y − xf 	L
1 	y
dy x ≥1
The second and fourth equalities are obtained by noting
that 1 = 0 and B1 = y −1 on D1	L
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We can obtain the probability distributions for A2 and B2 as
PrA2 ≥ y − x=






2 	2+ x− y
 x ≤ y < 2
0 y ≥ x+2
(A.13)
PrB2 ≤ x− y=






2 	2+ x− y
 x ≥ y
(A.14)
By inserting Equations (A.13) and (A.14) in Equation (A.12)
and simple algebraic manipulation, we obtain Proposition 2.
Proof of Theorem 1. For part (i), we prove the continu-
ity of C1	S1 S2
. The case for i = 2 is the same. In Proposi-
tion 1, we showed that S∗1 ≥ Z1. On the other hand, since




























 ∈ , =  Z1 S1!×  Z2 S2!, a compact subset
of R2. Let 	Sk1 S
k
2 
 be a sequence in S converging to 	S1 S2

















) = 	h1+ b1








We first note that 	Sk1 − Xk1 − D1	l1 + 1

+ ≤ S1, and Sk1
and Xk1 converge to S1 and X1, respectively. Therefore the
first expectation in (A.15) converges to E 	S1 − X1 − D1 ·
	l1 + 1

+! by bounded convergence theorem (Billingsley
1986). Since Xk1 ≤ D1	L
 + D2	L
, the second expectation
in (A.15) converges to E X1+D1	l1+ 1
− S1! by dominated




converges to C1	S1 S2
, which proves continuity.
For part (ii), we show the convexity of C1	S1 S2
 for a
given S2; the argument for C2	S1 S2
 is basically the same
by symmetry. Recall that S1−X1 = S1−D1	L
+1−2. For
a given S2 and D2	L
, we either have A2 > 0 (and B2 = 0) or
A2 = 0 (and B2 > 0). Hence
C1	S1 S2





Case 1. A2 > 0











































































Because Z1 is the unique minimizer of G1	x
, both G′′1 terms
in (A.19) are strictly positive.
Case 2. A2 = 0
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Again, as Z1 is the unique minimizer of G1	x
, both G′′1
terms in (A.22) are strictly positive.
We prove part (iii) for i = 1 (the case i = 2 is the same by




































































































Finally, we can rewrite (A.24) by using G′1	x




 for x ≥ 0, and G′1	x
= 0 for x < 0:
U1	S1 S2










= −b1+ 	h1+ b1
H1 ∗ F 	l1+1
1 	S1
 (A.25)









Therefore, for a given value of S2, one can obtain the
optimal order-up-to level of the second retailer, S∗1 	S2
 by
solving (A.25).
Proof of Theorem 2. We first show that U1	S1 S2
 = 0
and U2	S1 S2
 = 0 form decreasing curves in 	S1 S2
 plane,
and the slope of the curve
J1	S1
= S2/ U1	S1 S2
= 0 S1 ≥Z1
is less than the slope of the curve
J2	S1
= S2/ U2	S1 S2
= 0 S1 ≥ 0
which establishes the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium.
In particular, we show that
(i) U1	S1 S2
= 0 and U2	S1 S2
= 0 form strictly decreas-
ing curves in 	S1 S2
 plane. That is,
dJ1	S1





Let S12 and S
2
2 be values of S2 solving U1	S1 S2
 = 0 and
U2	S1 S2
 = 0 for a given value of S1, respectively. Let
0S12/0S1 and 0S
2
2/0S1 be derivatives of U1	S1 S2
 = 0 and
U2	S1 S2
 = 0 at 	S1 S2
. We use implicit differentiation of
U1	S1 S2



















































































Similarly, we use implicit differentiation of U2	S1 S2
 = 0
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which proves part (i). For part (ii), we compare (A.27)







Using this result together with Theorem 1 ensures the
unique solution given in Theorem 2.
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